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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. BARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 20870

vs.
DR. HOWARD R. FRANCIS, DEANNE
TANNER FRANCIS, DR. LARRY
FRANCIS AND ANN BANKS FRANCIS,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
Robert Barker, the appellant, was the owner of farm land
situated in Carbon County and shares of water stock in the
Schofield Reservoir, also known as the Price River Water Users
Association.

The

shares of water

stock enabled

Barker to

irrigate the land and use it for the cultivation of crops.
153-155; 178; Exs. 24 and 25)

In December of 1979, Barker met

Roger Olson, a real estate agent with Farm
Company of Provo.

(TR.

& Ranch Realty

Olson had contacted Barker to inquire as to

his interest in selling the farm land or water stock and to
obtain a listing agreement for the property.
list the property with Olson.
expressed
61; 157)

his

interest

in

Barker declined to

During their conversation, Barker
acquiring

ranch

property.

(TR.

Roger Olson was a dental patient of respondent, Dr. Larry
Francis of Provo and generally knew that he owned an interest in
ranch property situated in Carbon and Duchesne counties.

In

January of 1980, Olson discussed the ranch property, known as
Nine Mile Ranch, with Dr. Larry Francis and his brother, Dr.
Howard Francis.

(TR. 17-20; 63; 363)

The Francis1 desired

to sell the ranch property for $600,000.

(TR. 27; 64; 3 63)

Olson obtained authorization from Dr. Howard Francis to show the
property to prospective purchasers.

Dr. Howard Francis and Roger

Olson further agreed that upon sale of the ranch property, Olson
would receive a commission.

(TR. 63; 337)

The Francis1 were

investors in real estate, having bought and- sold several properties throughout the State of Utah.

(TR. 17-19)

After securing the authorization to show the ranch property
and to receive a commission for sale thereof, Olson contacted
Barker about the ranch.
Francis ranch property.

He spent a day showing Barker the
(TR. 64)

Thereafter, Barker indicated

to Olson his interest in the ranch property and on February 27,
1980, an Earnest Money Agreement was prepared by Olson and signed
by Barker.

The Earnest Money Agreement provided that the ranch

property was valued

at $600,000 and that Barker offered to

purchase it by paying $1,000 earnest money along with 80 acres of
his farm land and a number of shares of his Schofield Reservoir
2

water stock.

(TR. 66; 160; Exs. 1 and 27; Addendum - Exhibit

"A")
Olson took the Earnest Money Agreement to Larry and Howard
Francis and they made a written counter-proposal on it and had
Olson return it to Barker.

(TR. 21; 67) Written negotiations on

the Earnest Money Agreement between Barker and the Francis1 continued, ultimately culminating in final terms written on the
agreement acceptable to all parties dated April 21, 1980.
67-70; 161-161; Ex. 1)

(TR.

The words "Agree to above" were written

on the agreement at that time and it was signed by Robert
Barker, Howard Francis and Larry Francis.

(TR. 67-70; 161-162;

Ex. 1)
Several days

later, Barker retained

Therald Jensen, an

attorney from Price, to prepare a deed and to secure title
insurance for the closing.

(TR. 162-220)

title search and title insurance.

Mr. Jensen ordered a

(TR. 223)

Olson retained Dan

Keller, an attorney from Price, to prepare the closing documents
for the Francis1.

He had been authorized by the Francis1 to

secure and retain the services of someone to prepare the necessary documents for closing.

(TR. 29; 35; 162; 260-262)

Keller ordered a title search and title insurance.

Mr.

(TR. 262)

Since the title search and issuance of title insurance
could not be completed by the May 1, 1980, closing date, Mr.
3

Jensen wrote a letter to the Francis1 and suggested a June 10,
1980 closing date.

(TR. 222; Ex. 5)

Failing to receive a reply

from the Francis1, Jensen wrote them again on July 16, 1980.
(TR. 327; Ex. 6)

The Francis1 did not reply to Jensen on

either occasion, instead Dr. Howard Francis wrote to Barker on
July 28, 1980 and later went to the Barkers1 home in August of
1980 in an attempt to modify certain provisions of the Earnest
Money Agreement earlier agreed to by him, Dr. Larry Francis and
Robert Barker.

(TR. 32-35; 38-42; Ex. 7)

He was primarily

interested in retaining the $10,000 lease payment on the ranch
coming due on November 1, 1980 from Gary Sprouse.

(TR. 38-42)

Terms of compromise were later proposed by Mr. Jensen to the
Francis1 and their attorney, Mr. Taylor of Spanish Fork, in order
to carry out the agreement without costly litigation to enforce
it; however, in the end, the Francis1 declined to go forward.
(TR. 257-258; Exs. 8, 10, 12 and 14)
Barker filed a Complaint in the Seventh Judicial District
Court on August 22, 1983 seeking specific performance of the
Earnest

Money

Agreement

against

Dr. Howard

Francis, Deanne

Tanner Francis, Dr. Larry Francis and Ann Banks Francis.
1-15)

(R.

The Complaint was later amended seeking specific perfor-

mance and damages.

(R. 42-45)

An Answer to the first Complaint

was filed by the defendants as was an Answer to the Amended
4

Complaint.

(R. 21-22; 46-48)

Discovery was taken by the

parties and the case was tried without a jury before Judge Boyd
Bunnell on March 7 and 8, 1985.

(R. 155-159)

The court ruled that the Earnest Money Agreement was an
enforceable contract between Barker and Dr. Howard Francis and
Dr. Larry Francis.

Specific performance of the land contract was

not ordered because the court found that it could not be enforced
against Deanne Tanner Francis, the wife of Dr. Howard Francis,
since she had not signed the contract nor had she, the court
held, authorized her husband to act as her agent when he signed
the contract.

The court found that Deanne Tanner Francis and Ann

Banks Francis each owned an undivided one-fourth interest in the
ranch property.

No finding was made concerning whether Ann Banks

Francis had authorized her husband, Dr. Larry Francis, to act as
her agent when he signed the contract.

The court further ruled

that Robert Barker was entitled to damages for Dr. Howard Francis
and Dr. Larry Francis1 breach of the contract and awarded Barker
nominal damages of $1.00.

The court found he had not presented

evidence to establish loss of the benefit of the bargain contract
damages.

He was awarded costs and attorney's

established at a later hearing.

fees, to be

(R. 173-177)

Reasonable attorney's fees and costs were awarded in the
sum of $22,126.80 at a subsequent hearing.
5

(R. 229)

The court

later modified its ruling to hold that Dr. Larry Francis, the
husband of Ann Banks Francis, did not act as her agent when
signing the contract and the court dismissed Ann Banks Francis
and Deanne Tanner Francis entirely

from the judgment.

(R.

234-240)
Mr. Barker filed an appeal from the trial court's ruling on
assessment of damages to this court.

(R. 224)

Subsequently the

respondents, Dr. Howard Francis and Dr. Larry Francis, filed a
cross-appeal to this court.

(R. 250)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In cases of equity, the Supreme Court exercises a broad
scope of review that covers both questions of law and questions
of fact.

Where the trial court has based its ruling on a

misapplication of the law, the Supreme Court may rectify the
error or where the occasion warrants, the Court may fashion its
own remedy according to the demands of justice.
The trial court erroneously denied the appellant the remedy
of specific performance of the enforceable provisions of the
land contract.

A proper remedy for this action is partial

specific performance ordering the conveyance of the appellant's
farm land and water stock to the respondents, Dr. Howard Francis
and Dr. Larry Francis, in exchange for $600,000, because they are
unable to convey their ranch land to the appellant due to their
6

own actions.

$600,000 represents the purchase price appellant

was to receive for his land and stock.

The appellant will

receive adequate compensation for the respondents' breach of
contract only by this remedy.
Any

questions

concerning

the values

of the appellant's

property or the respondents' property may be determined by the
trial court on remand

for further proceedings

in the event

partial specific performance of the contract cannot be ordered
and the appellant is left to monetary damages as his sole remedy
for the respondents1 breach of contract.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EQUITY REVIEW ALLOWS AN APPELLATE COURT
TO REVIEW BOTH QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND TO SUBSTITUTE
ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
An action for specific performance is an equitable action.
Cook v. Gardner. 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963).

In cases

of equity, the Supreme Court exercises a broad scope of review
encompassing both questions of the law and questions of fact.
Matter of Hock's Estate. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982).
stated in Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980):
In cases of equity, this court is authorized
to exercise a broad scope of review encompassing both questions of law and questions of
fact.
While we have recognized the trial
court's advantageous position in relation to
7

The court

questions of fact, when the trial court has
based its ruling upon a misunderstanding and
misapplication of the law, where a correct
one would have produced a different result,
the party adversely affected is entitled to
have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under principles of law.
It is the duty and prerogative of the Supreme Court, where
the occasion warrants, to substitute its own judgment for that
of the trial court and to fashion its own remedy according to
the demands of justice.
(Utah 1982).

Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P. 2d 1017

In Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980),

the court stated:
This court is charged with the review of
both facts and law in equity decisions, and
may, where the occasion warrants, substitute
its own judgment for that of the trial court
and fashion its own remedy according to the
demands of justice.
The court's broad power should be exercised in the case at
hand to apply the appropriate equitable remedies in order to
grant the relief requested by the appellant.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PARTIAL
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND AWARDING
MONETARY DAMAGES OF ONLY $1.00.
The trial court ruled that the Earnest Money Agreement was
an enforceable contract between the appellant, Robert Barker,
and two of the respondents, Dr. Howard Francis and Dr. Larry

Francis.

Specific performance of the land contract, which would

have exchanged the appellant's farm land and shares of water
stock for the respondents1 ranch property, was denied by the
trial court because of its ruling that Ann Banks Francis and
Deanne Tanner Francis were each owners of an undivided one-fourth
interest in the ranch property and neither of them had signed the
contract or agreed to it.

Denying mutual specific performance,

the trial court determined that the appellant was entitled to
monetary damages for the breach of contract based on loss of the
benefit of the bargain calculated by the difference between the
market value of the respondents' land and the market value of the
appellant's land and water stock.

Determining that the appellant

failed to establish loss of the benefit of the bargain damages,
the court awarded only nominal damages of $1.00.
The damages for breach of the land exchange contract sought
by the appellant, under circumstances wherein one party can
perform and the other party cannot convey any property, has not
heretofore been ruled upon by the Utah Supreme Court.
case of first impression.

This is a

Understandably, few cases concerning

land exchange contracts reach the appellate level since contracts
of that type are fairly uncommon and those which have reached
the appellate level in other jurisdictions have not involved a
breaching party unable to convey any property and a non-breaching
9

party willing to convey and accept the contract dollar figure
for his property.
The appellate decisions concerning specific performance of
exchange of land contracts have developed the general rule of law
that an exchange of land contract may be specifically enforced
in the same manner as a sale of land contract.

The rule is

stated in 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance § 119, (1973) as
follows:
A contract for the exchange of real estate
may be specifically enforced the same as one
for an ordinary sale. The ordinary rules in
regard to specific performance will be
applied to a contract of this type.
There is no material difference between an
exchange and the sale of lands with respect
to the principles in which a court of equity
must proceed in compelling or refusing
specific performance.
In either case, the
agreement must be fair and just in all
parts, and founded on an adequate consideration; if the agreement is wanting in either
of these essential elements, the court will
not interfere.
The general rules of specific performance as applied to the
case at hand demonstrate that the appellant

is entitled to

enforce conveyance of his land and stock in exchange for its
purchase price as established by the contract at $600,000.
As a party to an exchange of land contract, the appellant
is in effect a vendor of the land and stock he is selling or
exchanging.

The well-established precedent in real estate sales

contract decisions is that a vendor or a purchaser may obtain
specific performance.

See, Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah

1975); Wagner v. Anderson, 250 P.2d 577 (Utah 1952); Streater v.
White, 613 P.2d 187 (Wash. App. 1980); Wittick v. Miles, 274
Or.

1, 545 P.2d

121

(1976); Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortq. &

Securities Company, 432 P. 2d 603

(Ala. 1967).

As a general

rule, specific performance is available to the vendor as well as
the vendee because the remedy is deemed mutual and compensation
based on the loss of the benefit of bargain is deemed inadequate
to compensate the vendor for the breach of contract.

The rules

are stated in 71 Am.Jur.2d Specific Performance, § 115, (1973).
It is well-settled that the vendor in a
contract for the sale of land, when fully
able, ready and willing to comply with his
contract by conveying the title and quality
of land which he contracted to sell, may
obtain in his favor a decree of specific
performance of the contract, although the
relief actually obtained by him is the
recovery of money - the purchase price - for
which he may also have a remedy by action at
law.
The remedy by specific performance is
deemed to be mutual as between vendor and
vendee. It has sometimes been said, however,
that equity compels specific performance in
favor of the vendor, not on the ground of
mutuality of remedy but on the ground that
compensation in damages, measured by the
difference in price, as ascertained by the
market value and by the contract, is not
regarded as adequate indemnity for the
nonfulfillment of the contract.
11

The appellant, as vendor of his 80 acres of land and 18 0
shares m of water stock, is entitled to specific performance and
is entitled

to

receive the purchase

respondents,

$600,000.

That

sum

price promised

is clearly

stated

by the
in the

contract, as it reads "The total purchase price of ($600,000)".
(TR. 21; Ex. 1)
The ability of the appellant to perform was established at
trial by his testimony

(TR. 163) and the introduction into

evidence of his deed for the sale of the farm land and bill of
sale for the sale of the water stock.

(TR. 167; Exs. 29 and 30)

It is no defense that since the appellant did not perform prior
to bringing suit that he cannot obtain specific performance.
The appellant was not required to perform by conveying his
property prior to bringing suit when he knew the respondents
were not going to perform.

It is sufficient that he was ready,

willing and able to perform but did not because it would have
been a useless act.

Reed v. Alvey, 610 P. 2d 1374 (Utah 1980).

The court stated in Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 18 6 P. 437
(1919) :
It is a basic premise of equity that the law
will never compel a person to do that which
is vain or useless.
A proper order from the trial court would have enabled the
appellant to convey his property to the respondents pursuant to
12

the terms of the contract.
have received

In exchange, the appellant should

from the respondents

$600,000, as established

by the terms of the contract as the purchase price for the
appellant's property and stock.
consistent with

the

Such an order would have been

appellant's

exchange of land contract.

rights

as a vendor

to the

He is entitled to specific perform-

ance of his property in exchange for its agreed purchase price.
Case

law

precedent

firmly

establishes

a vendor's

specific performance of a land sales contract.

right to

Equity compels

specific performance on the sound basis that damages measured by
the difference between market value and contract price would not
provide

adequate

compensation

for .the

injured

non-breaching

party to the contract.
Unable to grant mutual specific performance, because the
respondents cannot convey the ranch property, the court may grant
partial specific performance.

The exchange of land contract

should be specifically enforced

in part so as to order the

appellant to convey his land and stock with compensation based
on the purchase price of $600,000.

No sound reason in principle

or authority exists to deny such equitable relief to the nonbreaching party.
The objective of granting equitable relief by way of
partial specific performance is to do justice to the extent
13

feasible.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 358, Comment A.

An order can be fashioned by this court or on remand to the trial
court requiring the appellant to convey and ordering the breaching respondents to pay for the appellant's land and water stock
for the contract dollar figure of $600,000.

Such an order

serves justice, it poses no enforcement problem and it would not
be overly burdensome to either party.
Section 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, authorizes the use of individually fashioned partial specific performance orders.

It states:
Form of Order and Other Relief.

(1) An order of specific performance or an
injunction will be so drawn as best to
effectuate the purpose for which the contract
was made and on such terms as justice
requires.
It may not be absolute in form
and the performance that it requires need
not be identical to that due under the
contract.
(2) If specific performance or an injunction
is denied as to the part of the performance
that is due, it may nevertheless be granted
as to the remainder.
(3) In addition to specific performance or
an injunction, damages and other relief may
be awarded in the same preceding and an
indemnity against future harm may be required.
Ordering the relief granted by the appellant is within the
equitable power of this court.

Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338
14

(Utah 1980) and Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980).
order would not result in an injustice to either party.

The

Rather

it would fulfill the demands of justice and provide the appellant
with the only relief that can place him, the injured non-breaching party, in as near the position he would have been if the
contract had been carried out by the respondents.

Limiting the

appellant to damages based on loss of the benefit of the bargain
does

not

Appellant's
selling

provide

him

bargain

from

or exchange

$600,000.

with
the

adequate

or

contract

of his property

just

compensation.

encompasses
and the

both

the

attainment of

To maintain that he is entitled to the difference in

market value between his property and the respondents' could very
well provide him with no recovery against the breaching parties.
That would be an inadequate award, depriving him of any benefit
from the agreement and allowing the respondents, Dr. Howard
Francis and Dr. Larry Francis, to breach the contract without any
detrimental results.

The social policy of upholding the integ-

rity of contracts would be diminished by such an order.

Specific

performance is the appropriate remedy when damages would not
adequately compensate the injured party.

Delivery Service and

Transfer Company v. Heiner Equipment & Supply Company, 635 P.2d
21

(Utah 1981).

combine

specific

The remedy
performance

sought by the appellant would
and
15

damages

to

adequately

and

properly compensate the appellant for the breach of contract by
the respondents.

CONCLUSION
The appellant has demonstrated that the trial court erroneously denied him the remedy of partial specific performance of
the enforceable

land contract,

A proper remedy would have

ordered specific performance of the land and water stock of the
appellant in exchange for $600,000 since the respondents could
not convey their ranch land due to their own actions. This court
has within its power, while reviewing an equitable proceeding, to
rectify the result of the trial court or to otherwise fashion its
own remedy that meets the demands of justice.

In this instance,

justice is served by requiring conveyance by the appellant and
payment by the respondents.
tion of the law and

In the event this Court's examina-

facts determines that the trial court

appropriately ruled against specific performance, in whole or
part, the appellant is entitled to monetary damages based on the
breach of the contract by the respondents.

To determine the

appropriate amount of damages, this case should be remanded to
the trial court with instructions for a new trial or hearing on
the issue of determining appellant's damages.
16
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«.h.«-h representi tlM otorodoscnbed dpposit^ocoipt of which is hereby acknowledged by you
t

C. J%^/{^
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-=*

f ^ P ^ * ^ " ^ " ^ W * fHs/^^mm^^^*^
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on delivery o f j ^ e d o* fmal contract of
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20 ^S^ W£Z±4L ^ 4 r ^ ^ ^ y . &f*%e*^
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22 ^ ^ ^ "^J^LL^^7Z:C s* a*w ji£** 4J*JLj&» JGryzr 6*J& s«*<zfffor/9z<s.
23

until thv beianca of t * "

24

pay menu upon the unpaid balance

25
26
27

purchase price fe be included m the prescribed payments and shall begin a t of dare of possession which l h a l l be on or bmtan^^f^2
C
)9/3f*'
A l l risk of loss and destruction
of property, and eipentes of insurance shall be borne by the seller until date of possession at which tir»e property loses rents i n s u r a n c e , interest and other expenses of the property shall
be prorated a t of date of possession All other taies and ell assessments mortgages chattel liens and efher liens enewmbronces or charges against the property of any nature shell be poid
by the seller «»c»pf_
The following special improvements are included in this sale Sewer Q—Connected Q S e p t * Toek and or Cesspool Q Sidewalk C Curb and G»«er Q Special Street
Paving Q Special Street lighting Q Culinary Water (City Q—Connected Q Other Cemmun.ty System Q—Connected Q • n . a l e Q—Connected Q ) legend Yes ( * | No |->j eicept

30

"' •

"

"

w

^

^

w

, m mtorett i t paid

33 Contract of Sale or Instrument of conveyance to be made
35
36

provided

h«w«vor

rhot httym mt o n option

sebiact to tho limitotront o> any wortgaao or contrcKt by the b v r * ' horom astwmod

in the name of .

^

ot s«y ii«s«f

may pay omountt m o x o t i of tHo o e r

Interest O O — M B S — . ^g *V or onnvm on (he vnpoid portions of the

^*&tsu2^X?Z3?-

^^h<i payment it received and offer it made subject to the written acceptance of t*« seller endorsed hafaae wKtun
approved the return of the money heroin receipted shall cancel thit offer without damage to the undersigned ogent

d O T t from date nereef >
—

• event the purchaser fails to pay the balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase as here
is liquidated and agreed damages
39
40
4)

It is understood and agreed that the terms written in this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the purchaser and the seller and that * a verbal statement mode
by anyone relative to th s transaction shall be caastrued »o be o pan of this transaction unless incorporated in writing harem H it further agreed that oaecutien of the final contract shall
ebrogqre this Earnest Money tecetpt and Offer to Pur oho to
_
^<y
^
.

4
2 *7'*l^*l ^^S^^^^JL^^JJ^^

«
y /<^^^rYa^^^^===

W e do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the terms end conditions specified obeve
46
46

aad the teller agrees to fiemish good and marketable title with abstract to date c

option a policy of title msuronce in the nam* o f the perchaser and to moke final conveyance by jeorrpnry deed o r " ;
in the event of sale of other than real property, seller will provide evidence of Vtte or right to sell or lease I t either party fails to to d a he agrees to pay «
this agreement or of any right a n t i n g out of Ihe breach thereof including a reasonable attorney t fee

,4s<nTr?

,4&s/£<Lrt - rt^-^Zfr

yam<^£>

ffi*^1

/frtSc,if~ /4^4* hj<

58

(State !««» requires brokers to furnnh copies of thit contract bearing a l l signatures to buyer end seller

5?

I acknowledge receipt of a finol copy of the foregoing agreement hearing a i l signatures

Dependent upon the method BtjAi T ^ofl«\efT«i? following forms must be completed )

RECEIPT
60

....
Seller

61
62

I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing a l l tignefuret to be mailed to the Q—Setter
' | ^

»o

by regntered mod and rwturn receipt is attached hereto

Q Purchaser

^fcT^

^2.

A^tfe- <

-^^y^j^^JGyp -*C,
7

